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Abstract
Until very recently, equity financing is more in line with the spirit of Islam as 
compared with debt financing. As such, mushārakah and mudārabah are the 
preferred modes for Islamic investors. It is therefore a matter of a concern that 
even after four decades after Islamic finance captured the attention of investors 
around the globe, these two purest genres account only for a small percentage of 
Islamic financial industry. The paper examines more searchingly for the reasons 
why mushārakah and mudārabah occupy such insignificant place among Islamic 
financial products. This paper offers an analytical insight. 




1.  Introduction 
The central question addressed in this paper is about one major challenge leaping 
off the page of virtually any narrative concerning the evolution of Islamic finance 
industry in the world. As any serious student would anticipate that challenge is 
this: why do the two of the purest Islamic capital-versus-noncapital instruments 
have remained such a small percentage of Islamic financial institutions’ portfolio 
all over the world? Those two most authentic, pristine, channels are mushārakah 
and muḍārabah contracts. Many analysts and commentators have commented 
upon this, and this paper attempts to answer this industry experience. 
While the specific characteristics of mushārakah and mudārabah will 
form the bulk of the rest of the paper, suffice to say that sharing profits as well as 
losses based on a pre-agreed profit-sharing ratios rather than pre-agreed profits 
in the contract is central to these two financing types. The paper describes the 
characteristics of mushārakah and mudārabah, especially the latter. Certain 
advantages could ensue in probing that question while emphasizing incentive-
compatibility across transactors with economic diversity. Conventional neo-
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classical economics have worked out a widely-used framework specifying pre-
requisites to choices among risky outcomes. Central to that framework are the use 
of indifference curves, and the use of incentive-compatibility to provide the logic 
to the conclusions reached. We propose to use that framework with necessary 
changes to provide an analytical answer to this dilemma of the industry.
The original framework is from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The 
concepts of ‘fair-odds line’, marginal rate of substitution, zero and non-zero 
rates of profits, and ‘budget lines’ are used with appropriate changes in this paper 
to stay in line with the institutional and incentives assumptions made in that 
work. Equilibria are established when neither the rabb-al-māl (capital provider) 
nor the mudārib (entrepreneur) has any material incentive to disturb any given 
status quo, earning ‘zero-profits’. When the risk-pool is homogeneous, the 
informational regime is by assumption complete and an equilibrium is achieved 
such that all capital to be provided by the rabb-al-māl will be mobilized and 
absorbed by the mudāribs. When mudāribs differ in their opinion on loss 
probability as well as on when information is asymmetric, the loss probability 
difference is unknown to the rabb-al-māl but is known to the mudāribs, so that 
less than complete absorption of the capital in the economy will likely result.  
The paper invokes agent heterogeneity and information frictions (adverse 
selection and moral hazards), the former is introduced in terms of differential loss 
probability. It establishes that in Islamic murārabah markets, the interposition 
of mudārib heterogeneity and information advantage will necessarily lead 
to separating ‘equilibria’ as the most likely competitive solution: pooling 
‘equilibria’ will tend to phase themselves out. That said, separating ‘equilibria’ 
will require the establishment of both voluntary signaling and enforced screening 
to be well-articulated institutional features of the market, so that the problems 
posed by hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral 
hazard) are substantively neutralized. 
Next, the paper examines in depth the reasons why mudārabah is accorded 
such insignificant share in league tables of Islamic financial products. We do that 
by invoking agent heterogeneity and information frictions (adverse selection 
and moral hazards). Heterogeneity is introduced in terms of different loss 
probability. The paper establishes that, as in the conventional insurance markets, 
in Islamic murārabah markets too, the interposition of mudārib (entrepreneur) 
heterogeneity and information advantage will necessarily lead to separating 
‘equilibria’ as the most likely competitive solution. Pooling ‘equilibria’ will 
tend to phase themselves out. That said, separating ‘equilibria’ will require the 
establishment of both voluntary signaling and enforced screening to be well-
articulated in the institutional features of the market, so that the problems posed 
by hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard) are 
substantively neutralized, if not altogether eliminated.
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section is 
about concept development within the Rothchild-Stiglitz framework. The reader 
will find in the third section the logical development of the framework extended 
to Islamic finance. Relevant conclusions are drawn in the concluding section 4.
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2.   Concept Development
The objective of this section is to assess the trends in Islamic finance industry 
in terms of the quantitatively small take-up of the various Sharī’ah-compliant 
finance as well as other miscellaneous Islamic financial products. The section 
provides brief definitions of the various lines of financial products from secondary 
sources. This would support our claim that these two modes of financing occupy 
a small share of the capital market. 
2.1  Definitions
Mudārabah instrument is a trustee partnership agreement. In it, two or more 
parties combine human and financial capital to share the risk of running an 
enterprise together, with the purpose of earning halal (permissible) profits. One 
of the two parties is called mudārib (the entrepreneur) who has the necessary 
skills, expertise and diligence but lacks capital. The second party called rabb-al-
māl provides the required financing to the entrepreneur. This is congruent with 
all economic practices of all human societies. Such a capital provider may be an 
Islamic bank, a finance company or a private investor, as for example as happens 
in private placements by entrepreneurs, which has become very popular since 
the 1990s as a fund raiser. The management of the enterprise and the production 
work are the exclusive responsibility of entrepreneur. Profits generated are 
shared between the two parties according to a pre-agreed ratio, not fixed returns 
on capital provided. To create a balanced contract, if a loss were to occur (due 
to no fault of the entrepreneur), the capital provider will lose his capital, and 
the entrepreneur will lose the value of time and effort she invested in nurturing 
the business. Under a court’s finding of any willful neglect by entrepreneur, the 
capital provider could sue for damages on grounds of neglect.
Mushārakah is a partnership or joint venture agreement whereby two 
or more parties contribute capital and management expertise to pursue earning 
halal (permissible) profits to be shared among them. All providers of capital are 
entitled to participate in management but are not necessarily required to do so, if 
one or more of them wish to opt out of full participation, he/she can do so with 
the agreement of rest of the members on terms to be mutually agreed. Profit is 
distributed among the partners in pre-agreed ratio while the loss is borne by each 
partner strictly in proportion to capital contributions. The capital of the company 
can be money or valuables such as merchandise or capital goods or inventories.
2.2  Why Have Mushārakah and Mudārabah Not Become Major Modes of 
Finance in Practice?
If personal circumstances or preferences prohibit going into entrepreneurship 
as a solo effort, partnership as embedded in the two instruments is allowed 
under the Islamic legal framework. That is one reason, as also the reason 
given after the landmark decisions of sovereigns in about five centuries ago, to 
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permit their citizens to engage legally in sole proprietorship, joint ventures and 
also as joint stock companies (starting from the days of the Columbus’s joint 
venture with Queen Isabella of Spain, in the case of conventional partnership). 
Islamic teachings laud the principle of pursuing profits while exhorting parties 
to contract splitting exposure to risk-taking equitably. In the more than two-
centuries old history of modern banking, the idea of sharing risk has been pushed 
back through financing arrangements, where the entrepreneur solely bears the 
risk and the financiers developed contracts that do without any risk-sharing, 
requiring payments for funding.
The Qurãn states, “Allah has made buying-and-selling permissible, but 
ribā impermissible”: [2:276]. Buying and selling legally-permitted goods is all 
about pursuing legitimate returns while embracing risks equitably is enshrined 
in contracts. Mushārakah and mudārabah contracts are the most authentic 
financing products in Islam, because returns qualified by risks provide their 
bedrock. One of the first tests of genuineness in Islamic financing is about 
the proportion it accords to mushārakah/mudārabah. The available evidence 
emphatically suggests that about ninety percent of Sharī’ah-compliant financing 
as of late 1990s used to be on murābaḥah (sale on deferred payment basis) or 
joint-venture (Iqbal et al., 1998).
More recently, the percentage share of these contracts mushārakah/
muḍārabah in the total funding provided by banks during the six-year period 
ending in 2011 averaged about 7 per cent whereas the corresponding percentage 
owing to murābaḥah  (a third form) is as high as 85 per cent (Goud, 2012). A 
long-term evaluation of the operation of Islamic Bank of Bangladesh (IBBL) 
over about a quarter century shows the following. Over the first three years, 
mushārakah/mudārabah had accounted for some 15 per cent of banking finance 
whereas during the latest two decades that percentage shrank practically to almost 
single digits (Belal, Abdelsalam & Nizamee, 2010). In general, mushārakah and 
mudārabah accounts account for less than a tenth of the financing provided by 
Islamic banks worldwide (Iqbal & Molyneux, 2005). The sub-total is found to 
range anywhere between 9.7 and 7.8 per cent (Goud, 2012).
For those in the know, such isolation of variable-returns products in 
Islamic finance is readily understandable, though regrettable. The underlying 
argument is all about incentive-incompatibility. 
For a financing structure to work economically and sustain interest over 
time, sufficient incentives of participant interest-groups need to be dovetailed. 
Otherwise, the contract will soon slacken off. A simple sale contract between a 
buyer and a seller takes place only if there is synchronization of needs and an 
agreement on price.1 In the event of a default of a conventional debt contract, the 
accumulation of arrear interest is itself a deterrent to default. In a murābahah-
based sale contract for deferred payment, such a deterrent is itself less effective 
in the absence of a penalty clause. However, it provides less protection to the 
1  The remainder of this paragraph borrows heavily from Dar (2007).
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financier as they cannot benefit from the proceeds of the penalty, which are 
paid out to designated charities. This less favorable treatment of the financier 
may result in higher pricing of Islamic financing products based on murābahah. 
Murābahah makes the incentives of the providers and the users of capital 
substantively compatible. This is largely the message of Table 1.
2.3  Comparative Incentive-Compatibility among Different Islamic Financial 
Products
Table 1 contains summary statistics on a variety of Sharī’ah-compliant financial 
products. Whereas for murābahah, the deficit relative to ribā-based regime is 
passed off as being only marginal, for mushārakah and mudārabah, the deficits 
are said to be significantly less. For three other financial products, the incentive-
compatibility are said to be only moderately less compared with (roughly) 
equivalent conventional banking systems.









Murābaḥah Fund user Fund user Marginally less Penalty clause, 
buyer 
undertaking
Ijāra wa iqtina ʿ Fund user Financier Moderately less Undertaking 
from 
financier
Salam Financier Fund user Moderately less Parallel salam
Istiṣnā ʿ Shared Shared Moderately less Parallel istiṣnā ʿ
Muḍārabah Shared Fund user Significantly less Strong 
monitoring 
and supervision
Mushārakah Shared Shared Significantly less Strong 
monitoring 
and supervision
Source: Hassan and Lewis (2007).
Several explanations have been offered as to why murābahah is so ubiquitous, 
pervasive and durable. The motives include, (i) capital protection while 
generating Sharī’ah-compliant profits through making financing available; (ii) 
risk transfer through an internal market; (iii) hedging against the undermining of 
the environment of financing integrity arising from informational frictions; and 
(iv) other means. Also, in any modern economy, partnership tends to be the most 
common form of business form because of the ease with which partnership can 
provide capital. In addition, the laws provide easy exit from partnership to sole 
ownership, if the parties desire to go that way.
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2.4  Why Should We Care if Proportion of Mushārakah/Mudārabah is 
Small?
The small size of mushārakah/mudārabah as a percentage of Sharī’ah-compliant 
financing raises questions about the genuineness of Islamic finance in economic 
life. This arises mainly on two grounds. First, by restricting to a small percentage 
share, the most original and authentic mode of finance in Islam presents Islam’s 
these two financing models as an apologist.
Second, compared with murābahah, which is the fastest growing segment 
in the Islamic finance industry, mudārabah/mushārakah have the potential of 
rendering careers in business and entrepreneurship more broadly-based, and thus 
leveling the playing field of investment.
Murābahah can of course be readily tailored to scale up with regard to a 
whole range of physical, income-generating assets such as diagnostic laboratories, 
private hospitals, dentists’ clinics, beauty-parlors, all manner of testing (soil, 
water, etc.), cyber-cafes, desktop-printing shops, engineering consulting firms, 
fire-advisors’ businesses, etc. These are well outside and beyond the oft-quoted 
space of real estate and vehicle purchases. That contract can cast a wide net in 
terms of how many categories of businesses it could serve well. 
That said, these murābahah-favorite business categories mostly feature 
relatively high entry barriers due to specialization and the associated human-
capital requirement. They are heavily skewed towards specialized services 
and imply a narrow demographic base. They will of necessity ride the crest of 
an expensive kind of human capital accumulation, which in any case will be 
limited in number. No matter how exuberant, the problem surrounding such 
growth will still leave Islam’s implementation record removed from the bona-
fide maqāsid al-sharī’ah. The latter are much more likely to prefer financing 
of a larger, direly under-capitalized mass of small and medium enterprises in 
production, manufacturing, and trade. In many economies, with only one percent 
of businesses being outside the fold of tiny, small or medium enterprises, these 
statistics actually represent the very heart of a financing problem that needs to 
be pointed out. Most entrepreneurial units typically struggle on account of a 
mismatch between the availability of business skills and capital. Murābahah 
does not reach a large number of needy people. All this will undoubtedly amount 
to a strategy of obliging the top of the ladder investors. Given the dominance of 
murābahah type contracts, the typical spectacle of Sharī’ah-compliant financing 
appears to be incongruous with transforming the entrepreneurship in the economy 
that could advance socio-economic objectives and mandates of societies. 
Provisioning of capital is among the most strategically important action 
driving economic growth in any economy. The provisioning of capital via the 
rabb-al-māl mode is akin to supplying blood in a body. Without effective coupling 
of capital, and technical, organizational, managerial and human-resources skills 
(of entrepreneurs) no income-generating project can bear fruit. Even so, the 
centrality of capital in the development process is inescapable as is well known 
and acknowledged by all economists, including the Islamic economists. Modern 
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economic analysis suggests that almost two-thirds of a dollar of GDP in an 
average economy is the result of capital injection to production process: labor 
input accounts for almost the rest of the productivity. 
Of course, the compact between the two partners would need to be framed 
by the goals set and constraints to be faced by a business as agreed to by both 
the financier and the entrepreneur. The savings that the financiers bring aboard 
will have involved conscious postponement of consumption by today’s owners 
over many past periods. The opportunity cost of today’s capital in terms of past 
sacrifice can be very significant. Today’s capital is the prospective mainspring 
of all future streams of income for the rabb-al-māl. While one always expects 
one’s endowment of capital to perform financially, the opposite, however, may 
no doubt could happen, thus introducing asymmetric expectations. 
Consider in contrast the situation of the mudārib. The entrepreneur’s 
claim to the prospective profits stems from his business skills in general. 
For a manufacturing concern, such skills will run across the whole gamut of 
production process from ideas through the prospective product positioning 
to picking a path towards operational success from an intelligent analysis of 
the competitive scenarios and finally to efficient transformation of all inputs 
into a profitable proposition. The entrepreneur is potentially irreplaceable in 
any productive economic activity as he/she brings to the table a repertoire of 
specialist skills, capabilities and expertise, which at times could be unique. There 
can be no denying the unique contribution that a good mudārib can potentially 
make to the success of a project. Recent evidence of world economic recovery 
after the Global Financial Crisis attest to the fact that jobs are created by the 
entrepreneurial activities of innovative persons. 
2.5  Rabb-al-māl Deserves Priority in Policy Formulation
Having stated that, it is still imperative to consider at least three dimensions of 
the comparative situation of the entrepreneur and the financier before one is able 
to absorb the incentives/disincentives that characterize them.
First, capital owned by a financier is like a general-purpose vehicle. It is a 
malleable resource. As long as capital is in the form of unencumbered money, it 
represents a liquid form of buying power ready to be deployed in any productive 
sector for procuring goods or services or for paying for their transformation 
into any pre-set blueprint that an entrepreneur has prepared for socially useful 
products or services. Like all general purpose vehicles, capital faces the prospect 
of potentially profitable deployment across real sectors of an economy without 
the encumbrances of any significant adjustment or menu costs. 
In contrast, the same is in general not true of the muḍārib; if not in its 
entirety, then certainly to a degree. Unless the economy offers the services within 
well-defined markets of the full array of technological, managerial, logistical, 
information-technology skills, an entrepreneur has to agree to supply all or a part 
of what is required from the diverse array of competencies in entrepreneurship. 
It is impracticable for any one person or well-knit team to wrap their heads 
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around such diverse skills and capabilities for anything but a given production 
sector of interest. This suggests strongly a state of relative immobility: the 
entrepreneur’s skills are not intrinsically mobile across sectors. At a further 
remove, this suggests that the mudārib is exposed to non-negligible adjustment 
or menu costs when he/she has to change the sector of involvement. The main 
point is that a general purpose resource has an advantage that is denied to a more 
sector captive, specialized, resource of a mudārib. 
Second, owners of capital would likely enjoy greater negotiating leverage 
compared with the owners of sector-specific resources and skills. Whereas 
capital is likely to be universally in demand across several sectors or industries, 
the mudārib’s services are unlikely to face equally brisk demand regardless of 
the sector of interest. Once again, one sees capital’s generalized advantage to be 
contrasted with a disadvantage associated with relatively anemic demand across 
sectors and industries for services of mudāribs.
Third is the existence of information asymmetry. Asymmetric information 
comes in two varieties. There is adverse selection, something what Debraj Ray 
has called hidden information (Ray, 1998). Hidden information is about an 
economic agent actively seeking to create more positive, favorable, congenial 
perceptions about the prospective value of contribution(s) to an enterprise. 
There is no doubt that relative to the rabb-al-māl, the informational balance is 
very clearly with the muḍārib. We make a fuller presentation about the various 
aspects of informational asymmetry in the next section. What the rabb-al-māl 
brings to the equation suffers from not even a small measure of adverse selection 
(hidden information) or moral hazard (hidden action). The rabb-al-māl must 
simply deliver the amount of money committed to investment. Only when 
financier honors this commitment, one can monitor this fully and in a costless 
manner. That commitment, whose fulfillment takes places at the ‘input’ stage, 
will need to be honored to the last dime.
In contrast, the payoff in any transaction is often bound up with the 
output. Output is typically far less easily amenable to contractual formulation 
to everyone’s satisfaction than inputs (entrepreneurship and finance). The 
entrepreneur’s true contribution will be to the output although that output is not 
very clearly contractible, which becomes a decisive factor in the present context. 
Given the role of hidden information and hidden action in it, the output-producing 
process becomes an important source of uncertainty in the life of an enterprise. 
This introduces the important idea that the mudārib is potentially susceptible to 
engage in an adverse selection activity when a murārabah contract is signed.
Before going any further, one further relatively minor point needs to be 
covered. One should be aware that the following analysis is more relevant to pure 
types of murārabah than to mixed mudārabah. The assumption in this paper is 
that many of the individual mudāribs could all be relatively young people with 
professional qualification or unique ideas, but without much cash resources to 
start an enterprise. Their ability to put up collateral in cash or cash-equivalents 
may be too trivial or narrow. It may become absolutely impracticable for such 
mudāribs to front-load the deal by pledging something of economic value to 
financiers. 
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2.6   Indifference Curve Analysis 
In modern economics, the first use of indifference curves under asymmetric 
information was in analyzing welfare effects of insurance contracts. There are 
important differences between using indifference curves in discussing insurance 
markets and markets for Islamic partnership contracts. The transactions are 
monetary and two-way in nature in insurance: premium is paid by the insured 
with the expectation that someday they will be traded off for an indemnity to be 
paid by the insurance company. The equilibrium in insurance markets is said 
to take place when premiums paid into the plan is equal to the indemnity paid 
out. Premiums paid appear as debit entries on customers’ books of accounts 
but as credit entries on insurers’ books. Indemnities appear as credit entries on 
customers’ books of accounts but as debit entries on insurers’ books. 
This brings about incentive-compatibility of the insured versus the 
insurer. Prima facie, it could be said that analogous conditions to premiums 
and indemnity do not exist in the Islamic risk-sharing partnership contracts. At 
least, such a characterization would be entirely inconsistent with the profiles and 
attributes that mushārakah and muḍārabah possess. Secondly, then how can one 
conduct indifference curve analysis when discussing the choice of a method for 
trading between different states of outcome across a range of uncertainty?
3. Model Development
Consider a mudārabah market where each potential rabb-al-māl faces two states 
of the world. 
A profit result, in which case the wealth is w+P; and
A loss result, in which case the wealth is w-L. 
A state diagram is often used in the analysis implied here of risky bundles of 
economic outcomes. Before joining the mudārabah, we assume that the rabb-
al-māl’s wealth endowment is equal to w. After a mudārabah contract is agreed, 
the rabb-al-māl’s wealth endowment is changed as follows:
       
(1)
The probability of a loss occurring in any given year is assumed to be p. Therefore, 
the foregoing assignment essentially states that the wealth endowment in the 
event of a profit is W+P, where P is the profit that accrues to the rabb-al-māl. In 
the event of a loss, the endowment is changed to W-L, where L is the loss that 
accrues to the rabb-al-māl. Here, the parameters merely describe the murārabah 
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contract, with both profit and loss being shared between the rabb-al-māl and 
mudārib based on the profit and loss sharing ratio agreed beforehand. We choose 
to look at the economics of dealing in risky bundles through the filter of the 
rabb-al-māl. We also assume that all arbāb-al-māl (plural of rabb-al-māl) in 
an economy with Islamic finance being available are identical in all essential 
respects. This then suffices for the use of the model for a representative rabb-al-
māl. Denote the probability of an accident as p that an accident could precipitate 
a loss. A murārabah contract is assumed to exist primarily due to the initiative 
of the rabb-al-māl. Parties will buy into a murārabah contract if the expected 
utility of such a contract exceeds the utility of keeping the financier’s capital 
under his sole control:
          (2)
A rabb-al-māl will take on new murārabah proposals for implementation, 
subject to the availability of his capital, as long as the ratio of the probability of 
profitable and loss-making events is compatible with the actuarially fair odds.2
What level of deployment of capital would maximize the expected utility 
of the rabb-al-māl? In the model itself, both the odds of a profit or loss and 
the amount of the profit/loss could be admitted to be variable. In the context of 
answering this question, we fix the odds, and we ought to be able to do so without 
any loss of generality. It would be easy to treat the quantity of capital that any 
given rabb-al-māl would deploy on the basis of mudārabah as given. Before 
proceeding any further, we reformulate the foregoing equation by replacing both 
P and L as more appropriate profit (or loss) functions, as follows:
    (3)
Where f(K,L) merely represent the underlying production function, embodying 
the arguments of capital and labor-services. On purpose, we omit from the profit 
function the other variables, such as the price of the product in question, etc., are 
uncertain, in order to reduce notational clutter. We intend to do this without any 
loss of generality. 
For the time being, we are using the role, incentives and effects on the 
rabb-al-māl as defining the focal point of this analysis. The expected utility 
would be maximized when the first-order condition with respect to the foregoing 
equation is equal to zero:
     (4)
2 In terms of the terminology of the insurance-market literature, actuarially fair odds correspond to 
a situation in which the insurer ends up with zero profits, as the premia paid by the insured exactly 
equals the indemnity paid against the policy. 
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That implies the following:
That further implies  
This finally implies that the expected utility from forming mudārabah would be 
maximized when the partnerships are being formed along the actuarially fair-
odds line. 
The easiest situation to set up is a 2-state set up with p1 = p and p2 = 
1− p. An interesting way to represent preferences in this case is with a standard 
consumer model over two goods, consumption in state 1 and consumption in 
state 2. As usual, an indifference curve is given implicitly by setting utility to 
a fixed value and treating one variable (say x2) as a function of the other (x1). 
Individuals maximize        E [u (x)] = pu (x1) + (1 − p) u (x2)                         
(5)
where, the superscript of ‘IC’ is meant to convey the fact that (W+P) is being 
assumed to be a function of (W-L).We formally substitute x1 for (W-L) and x2 
for (W+P).
Differentiating this condition implicitly once gives the condition:
     
 (6)
Along the 45-degree line of a graph putting x1 against x2, where x1 = x2, then 
         =        .  Along such a line, marginal rate of substitution between (W-L) and 
(W+P) will be equal to 
         
the odds-ratio, no matter the curvature of the utility 
function. This is one of the implications of expected utility theory, as applied to 
the two-state diagram.
The characteristic of the risk-pool is important to the outcome in terms 
of the inter-personal distribution of the payoff and any possibility of externality. 
The first thing that needs to be examined is about the homogeneous risk pool: 
this is the base case. The base case also provides an opportunity to look at the 
individual elements of the state diagram. It is to the examination of such a base 
case that we now turn our attention.
3.1 Integrity of Using State-Diagram from Mainstream Economics
Before proceeding any further, addressing the validity of implanting analytical 
construct(s) from microeconomics is helpful. One could argue that, whereas 
certain similarities and analogues may exist between the competitive equilibria in 
insurance markets in the presence of heterogeneity and incomplete information, 
the symmetry in the Islamic murārabah markets however breaks down at certain 
crucial junctures. For example, in the insurance markets, incentive-compatibility 
arises from the insured paying premiums into a pool, in anticipation of a quid 
pro quo in the form of the payment of the indemnity in the event of an accident. 
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Whenever the premium is set at a higher level than the actuarially fair premium, 
the degree of insurance coverage chosen by individuals is lower. 
In fact, the algebraic formulation of the ‘fair-odds’ line specifically 
includes both the (i) the probabilities of the loss and non-loss events; and (ii) the 
expected utility associated with the payment of the premiums and the indemnity. 
The institutional set-up of the murārabah match-up does not include such a hard-
wired dove-tailing of material incentives. Arguably, implanting the diagram 
containing fair-odds line, and indifference curves that intersect only once giving 
rise to the single-crossing property may be illegitimate.
Further discussion is needed. First, it is incontrovertible that the rabb-
al-māl and the muḍārib in Islamic economics will be interested to pool their 
resources only and solely with a desire to bring into better alignment their 
respective income or consumption or utility levels across two states of nature 
namely the occurrence of loss and the occurrence of profit. In short, the very 
proposition of the mudārabah is about trading between two collections of 
economic prospects with different degrees of potentially measurable uncertainty, 
which is called risk. 
The mainstream microeconomics witnessed vigorous development of 
analytical constructs that are especially relevant for grasping the drivers and 
policy implications arising from the trade-offs in such risky bundles (Cutler 
& Zeckhauser, 1998). This has been especially so since the conventional 
economics has been prodded by the discovery of the pervasiveness of incomplete 
information (in the sense of some information being hidden, selectively) and 
the challenges it entailed for much of the neo-classical economic analysis. In 
the analytical development, therefore, we have to depend necessarily on the 
constructs that have been used in the conventional microeconomics texts to probe 
the achievement of equilibrium under agent heterogeneity and under asymmetric 
information. Crucially, in doing so, one has to diligently bear in mind the role 
of the institutional differences between conventional risk markets and Islamic 
murārabah markets. Not every aspect of the expected-utility theory or the 
definition of risk-aversion/risk-neutrality would readily fit into a discussion of 
choices to be made in an Islamic economy. This parameter is adhered to very 
consciously in the writing of this paper.
Secondly, in seeking to improve the distribution of wealth amid riskiness, 
both the rabb-al-māl and the mudārib are parting with what is valuable to both; 
for one it is general-purpose money and for the other his work skills. But even 
the mudārib agrees to take the lids off from his commercial code of proprietary 
secrecy in operational matters when he agrees to pool resources with the investor 
because she has access to capital that would bring the output to reality as well 
as the profit share. It is the mudārib who is informationally advantaged to some 
extent.
The entrepreneur may also be possessed of specialized or highly 
specialized technical or process-related skills (windows technology of Bill 
Gates). Being willing to train employees in the murārabah will be tantamount 
to his being willing to share from his cache of trade secrets. That said, that 
particular effect may also mean partial, even substantial, neutralization of the 
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mudārib’s own competitive differentiation in future as the number of potential 
competitors swells through copycat replications (China syndrome). Erosion of 
one’s own essential competitiveness in informal markets, with loose intellectual 
property rights protection, for technical or even business skills, will often be 
channeled through informal training programs. There is a lot of evidence for that. 
For instance, Nathan Rosenberg of Stanford University has argued that scientific 
prowess is partial to publicity and assiduously seeks disclosure, publication, and 
dissemination. In sharp contrast, technical or process-related, or technological, 
prowess is publicity-shy, assiduously avoiding disclosure, duplication, free 
replication, and copying (Rosenberg, 1973). 
Scientists who stumble upon ground-breaking discoveries in areas of 
pure or natural science set great store by publishing quickly hoping that their 
craft will achieve the status of a classic. In contrast, innovators, who are after 
big payoff that follows commercialization, set great store by stealth, secrecy and 
successful rapid patenting of the essence of the technical or process innovation 
before the competition has even a wind of what is going on. In general, the 
more proprietary the technical or process related skill that the muḍārib brings to 
bear during the course of implementation of the business plan of the partnership 
enterprise, the more valid is the argument made in the previous paragraph.
As long as information relating to the loss and profit probabilities, and the 
distribution of expected profits and losses in the relevant events are available, the 
constructs of indifference curve, fair-odds line and incentive-compatibility, are all 
applicable with necessary changes. Of course, there will be one major difference 
between competitive equilibria between conventional insurance markets and 
the Islamic mudārabah markets. In the former, given that individuals are risk 
averse and insurance companies are risk neutral, the first best is characterized by 
full insurance. By assumption, insurance companies will enter into the industry 
as long as positive profits can potentially be made by selling insurance. The 
impulse towards less-than-full insurance will be undercut by competition until 
the zero-profit equilibrium is reached. In contrast, under the analysis conceived 
in this paper, the landmark evolutionary stage in market’s development is about 
a full subscription of the rabb-al-māl’s capital by the muḍāribs.
A sample of mudāribs could either be identical in terms of the individual 
probability of loss. Or the sample could harbor heterogeneous probability of loss. 
The issue needs to be framed diagrammatically in the interest of greater clarity. 
The underlying issues run the gamut from actuarially fair odds to incentives 
compatibility, all of which can be handled diagrammatically. The ratio of the 
probability of profit occurring compared with a loss is akin to the relative prices 
of two commodities being compared. Odds are actuarially fair when the likely 
return and risk are being traded at a rate equal to the ratio of the probability of 
profit versus loss occurring.
3.2   When the Risk Pool is Homogeneous
The domain of risk-pool includes all the mudāribs in the economy. The mudāribs 
could arguably be all identical in terms of their trade-related competencies, that 
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is, equally knowledgeable, shrewd, diligent, customer-friendly, well-tuned to 
the state of the market, and with identical leadership qualities. This would be a 
case of the rabb-al-māl facing a group of mudāribs with identical probability of 
loss. It is already assumed that all losses are equal to L. The loss probability (p) 
and the amount of the loss (L) are the only two variables in the present analysis. 
We shall want to keep L fixed in the following analysis. Fixing L is without 
loss of generality. We only need one free parameter here, either p or L: we will 
be using p below. There will be an initial endowment with coordinates of (W, 
W - L). This initial endowment is represented by the point E in Figure 1 below. 
The fair-odds line extends with slope equal to the odds ratio between the loss 
and no-loss states.
A rabb-al-māl will optimally allow full subscription of his entire capital, 
as long as profit rates offered by the mudāribs and the probabilities of occurrences 
of profit or loss do not fall shy of the rate commensurate with actuarially fair-
odds line. Following from the Von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility 
property, the highest indifference curve tangent to the fair-odds line has slope at 
its point of tangency with the fair-odds line, which is where it intersects the 45
0 
line. At this point, wealth is equalized across states. 
In Figure 1, the loss probability is shown on the vertical axis and the 
residual probability of profit on the horizontal axis. By initial assumption, both the 
mudārib and the rabb-al-māl have identical utility functions. Each indifference 
curve is about how either the mudārib or the rabb-al-māl trades between a state 
of risk-i.e., a pecuniary loss¾and a state of return¾i.e., a profit. The rabb-al-
māl will presumably face a multiplicity of demand for his capital, because by 
assumption there is a shortage of capital, the economy suffers from a scarcity of 
capital, and therefore capital-owners enjoy a sought-after status in the economy.3 
The full employment of all available capital in the economy is therefore also an 
imperative. Situations of the full subscription of the rabb-al-māl’s capital (in 
other words, the full coverage of capital provisioning) corresponds to points on 
the 45-degree line while situations of incomplete coverage lie to the right of the 
bisetrix (where W1 >W2).
The expected value of the loss in any given year could alternatively be 
represented by present value of future tax credits expected to materialize due 
to those losses, given the so-called loss-carry forward allowed universally in 
most tax codes. It bears repetition that losses racked up in the given year under 
discussion are by assumption being represented by present value of expected 
future tax credits receivable against them. This institutional assumption underlies 
this paper.  
3 Of course, both the mudārib and the rabb-al-māl will have mouth(s), including his own, to feed. 
By assumption, the former only has business skills which do not translate readily into command 
over food: if he does not have savings from past periods, the pressure upon the mudārib to team 
up with a rabb-al-māl and start up a murābahah will be immense. In contrast, the rabb-al-māl has 
cash resources on hand. He can just go to the market and buy what he needs, paying down with 
cash: he is not desperate for a mudārabah deal. 
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Figure 1: A two-state analysis of mushārakah/muḍārabah contract equilibria
Each investment project will be about trading expected losses in terms of 
expected profits. The indifference curve for risk is about the marginal rate at 
which expected loss is traded into units of expected profits¾the marginal rate 
of substitution between losses and profit. The ‘actuarially fair-odds line’ is the 
budget line. A budget line identifies the best budget constraint available to the 
agents (both the rabb-al-māl and muḍārib) for trading risk into returns. Put 
it differently, the budget line is about marginal rate of transformation of risk 
relative to returns. The slope of an investment project’s budget line would be 
different from others, of course. A budget line would have a steep slope if either 
the underlying enterprise or its mudārib is inherently more risky: it takes a larger 
amount of losses (expected future tax credits) to translate into a given amount of 
expected profit. A new enterprise in an industry with significantly greater start-
up difficulties or with high failure rates would exemplify such higher risks. In 
contrast, certain genetic, personality or background traits arguably predispose 
certain human beings to taking undue risks and thus more risky behavior. 
The ratio of the probability of loss to unity minus the probability of profit 
occurring is equal to the slope of the line representing the actuarially fair odds: 
this is the ratio               . When the slope of the budget line is equal to the slope 
of the indifference curve, the risks and returns are evenly balanced.4 The capital 
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4 In the insurance literature, such a situation is said to lead to zero profit for the marginal insurer, 
given full and free entry into the markets.
I2 I3
I1
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mudāribs looking for capital will be equal to the number of murārabah contracts 
that arbāb-al-māl are looking to enter into. For enterprises in a particular industry, 
the probability of the occurrence of loss in any given year of operation will be 
given. Given such a probability, the budget line corresponding to actuarially fair 
odds will represent an equilibrium. This will be a situation of full subscription of 
the capital that all the arbāb-al-māl put together will wish to bring on the market. 
Point E in Figure 1 corresponds to a situation of no deals involving 
mudārabah. Each point to the northwest of E represents a specific murārabah 
contract uniquely identified by a certain investment by the rabb-al-māl and an 
uncertain profit or loss (loss when there is a loss). The segment EF represents 
the actuarially “fair” odds line. The net payout from an uncertain ‘game’ is 
actuarially fair if the expected monetary gain, whether in cash or in putative 
(notional) terms, equals zero. Corresponding to each outcome of actuarially fair-
odds there is a budget line. The budget constraint that reflects the opportunities 
presented by an actuarially fair contract is called by an actuarist a fair-odds line. 
Along such a budget constraint, the expected value of all ‘states’ of income is 
equal, and no one group of transactors will be subsidized ex ante at the expense 
of any other group. 
In the insurance literature, this line is called the actuarially fair-odds 
line, or the zero-profit (for the insurance company) line. Of those two expressions, 
the first one, the actuarially fair odds line is probably more appropriate. This line 
identifies a locus of the break-even budget constraints available to the rabb-al-
māl and the mudārib for trading outcomes in the two (risky and good) states of 
affairs. The break-even is in a sense that it just brings the material interests of 
the two kinds of partners into the kind of alignment that makes it just worthwhile 
to team up.5
Trading income in the two states at a rate equal to the slope of EF leaves 
the rabb-al-māl and the mudārib with a harmonious balance: no new mudārib 
has any incentives for disturbing the status quo by offering the rabb-al-māl a 
more attractive profit rate. Starting from point E, any point to the south-west 
of EF entails combinations in which risk trades into return at a rate more 
preferential to risk-taking by the rabb-al-māl. There is always the supply of 
new candidates among mudāribs and are not spurned by the arbāb-al-māl. The 
underlying risk-return nexus is propitious for risk-taking. That said, such cannot 
be an environment conducive to the maintenance of equilibrium contracts (as 
any given profit ratio can always be undercut by a new aspiring murārabah 
contractee that attracts other arbāb-al-māl and still earns positive profits). In 
5 The one major difference between the terminology of the insurance markets and the Sharī’ah-
compliant financial products markets is here. In the insurance markets, the fair-odds line always 
corresponds to situations of zero profit for the insurer, which is evocative of an unambiguous 
aura of ‘fairness’ in the match-up between premia paid and the indemnity in prospect. The 
corresponding analogue in Sharī’ah-compliant markets can only be envisioned more in the 
abstract, as the concept of zero profit is no longer relevant. 
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contrast, any point to the north-east of EF entails risk-return combinations that 
are skewed against risk-taking and it is therefore not feasible. So, given free 
entry and perfect competition in long-term equilibrium, the arbāb-al-māl and 
mudāribs find their equilibrium contract along the set of contracts on the EF 
line. This notion of equilibrium contract connotes only a preference among all 
the arbāb-al-māl and muraribs not to upend the status quo. 
We can represent the preferences facing a proposed partnership enterprise 
with a map of indifference curves. Given risk-aversion by both prospective 
partners, the indifference curves are convex. Given any indifference curve, all 
the points to the northeast entail higher utility and all the points to the southwest 
entail lower utility. Equilibrium is on the highest indifference curve compatible 
with the expected ‘budget constraint’ provided this point also lies on the bisetrix, 
ie. point C. In C, the slope of the indifference curve is equal to the slope of EF.
Thus, when both the arbāb-al-māl and the mudāribs are risk averse, and 
there is complete information,3 the first best is characterized by full utilization 
of capital open to mudārabah.4 Whenever the marginal rate of transformation 
of risk into return is lower than the marginal rate of substitution of risk for 
returns, the appetite for risk remains relatively brisk, and the arbāb-al-māls’ 
capital that is set aside for the murārabah format will begin to move toward 
fuller deployment in risk-sharing. Gradually, the supply of such a quantity of 
mudārabah funds will also be equal to the amount of the funds for which the 
mudāribs have effective demand. 
The base case is unlikely to be an accurate description except in a minority 
of the cases. More realistically, the mudāribs are likely to be heterogeneous. A 
situation of incomplete information is typically in for the ride when the risk-
pool is heterogeneous. The presence of agent heterogeneity typically triggers the 
advent of private information. We now turn to this aspect of the problem.
3.3  Heterogeneous Risk and Adding Private Information
The mudāribs could conceivably be divided into two groups. One of these 
groups comprises mudāribs who are more risk-prone and impulsive, impetuous 
and single-track in their information-gathering, insufficiently attuned to both 
the short- and the long-term factors concerning competitive obsolescence of 
the equipment and technologies used in the project(s) under study. When they 
buy supplies, they fail to spot opportunities in the market for bargains, and 
to buy economically, running unduly bloated purchase costs. They are naïve 
and gullible, credulous ‘dummies’ who would readily put their trust even in 
strangers. They may not be the best judge of readily concluding that ‘an offer 
3 Complete information is said to exist when, in particular, principal-agent relationships do not 
labor under the weight of information frictions.
4 Note that only the murārabah-specific portion of the capital of the rabb-al-māl seeking deploy-
ment is relevant to this paper. Mushārakah -specific capital is not of relevance here. As well, 
given complete information, it is the points on the fair-probabilities line that the rabb-al-māl will 
become agreeable to deploying the whole of the murārabah-only portion of his capital. This is 
intuitively acceptable. 
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may be too good to be true’, and may fall unsuspectingly into a trap that may 
be deliberately sprang upon them. In short, some muḍāribs may have a mental 
make-up that makes them, even when they are entirely earnest, a loss-leader. 
Let us assume that the other group is made up of mudāribs who are 
even-headed and thoughtful, comprehensively networked and thus have reliable 
access to a relevant and wide array of information, are prudent and methodical, 
take a decision only after due processes and much careful reflection. The two 
classes of mudāribs are set apart from each other. There is a category of mudāribs 
who are prospective loss leaders. There is a second category of mudāribs who 
are prospective profit leaders. 
Under the watch of the first group of mudāribs, the murārabah is more 
likely to stumble into operating losses in the ventures they take up. The probability 
that the murāribāh in question turns up a loss for any given unit of time is higher 
than elsewhere in the economy, allowing for the specific characteristics of the 
sector of interest. Whereas under the watch of the second group of mudāribs, the 
probability that the mudārib in question will turn up a profit for any given unit of 
time is higher than elsewhere in the economy. 
Full deployment of capital of the rab-al-māl will necessarily involve 
trading profit income between occurrence of profits to be shared, and losses to 
be split. Equilibrium will be impracticable without the rab-al-māl being able to 
sort out the loss-leaders from the profit-leaders. The former need to be crowded 
out compared with the profit-leaders. Within each industry, the rab-al-māl ought 
to offer capital to the profit-leaders at a relative profit discount compared with 
the loss-leaders: profit ratios offered need to allow for an ‘industry-effect’. It is 
necessary to introduce the industry of origin as a qualifier because industries 
fundamentally differ in terms of the risk-return nexus: an explicit industry effect 
is an allowance that needs to be made when it comes to profit differentials among 
economic agents with different characteristics, such as susceptibility to losses. 
In addition, we admit private information into the discussion. This 
means that we assume that individual mudāribs know their risk type but this 
information is not known to the rab-al-māl. This assumption makes intuitive 
sense, too. Private information without heterogeneity is not meaningful; if 
everyone is identical, there is no private information.
Given the two risk types, ‘h’ and ‘l’, and the asymmetric information 
about these types, there are two possible classes of equilibria in the model. The 
first of these two is about pooling equilibrium. That is about a situation where 
the rabb-al-māl does not distinguish between risk-types, which are however for 
real. It is to this aspect that we turn first now. 
3.4  Pooling Equilibrium 
Figure 2 is drawn with the indifference curve corresponding to the high-risk 
(‘h’-type) mudāribs being flatter compared with low-risk (‘l’-type) mudāribs. 
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the high-risk mudāribs is hereby 
being assumed to be lower compared with the MRS of the low-risk muḍāribs. 
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The certainty equivalent of the initial without-any-mudārabah-contract state 
is higher for ‘l’ than for ‘h’ types since the type l have lower odds of a loss. 
Because the probability of loss is lower for type l, type l would want to raise 
their reservation profit ratio in their prospective contracts signed compared with 
high-risk mudāribs. Likewise, the low-risk types will feel entitled to lower the 
maximum loss ratios in their prospective contracts compared with high-risk types. 
The incentive-compatibility constraint of the low-risk mudāribs will entail that 
they would likely demand higher profit ratio in the event of a profit, and a lower 
ratio of loss in the event of a loss, both compared with the high-risk mudāribs.
Figure 2
The two risk types result in two different fair-odds lines for the two 
classes of mudāribs. That said, there will also be an aggregate fair-odds line, 
which will be some kind of an average of the two type-specific fair-odds lines. 
In a pooling equilibrium, both types of mudāribs get away with the same type 
of treatment by the rabb-al-māl. The achievement of equilibrium requires a 
construct in which such a treatment lies on the aggregate fair odds line. The 
outcome of a pooling equilibrium would be represented by the point ‘A’, and 
that point must lie on the aggregate fair odds line. If the point ‘A’ lies above 
that line, it would be unattractive to the rabb-al-māl and so would not exist in 
equilibrium. If it lies below such a fair odds line, the underlying risk proposition 
would be so attractive to the high-risk segment of the muḍārib population as to 
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So, at least for a while, there will be a tendency for some sort of pooled 
equilibrium, centered on the equivalent, in a Sharī’ah-compliant financing 
market, of the point A. But this pooled equilibrium will not be sustainable, and 
so a position like A would not ultimately exist in equilibrium. 
The pooled equilibrium will be sustained fundamentally by the perception 
that the mudāribs and rabb-al-māl have identical probabilities for causing an 
outcome of loss, whereas this assumption will in reality be untrue. The reality 
shall often be that some mudāribs have safer hands for managing the money 
than others: the latter will be riskier partners to manage money with. If this latter 
perception is the more valid one, then this pooled ‘equilibrium’ will also lead 
to an implicit cross-subsidization of the riskier sub-sample of the population, 
at the expense of the safer sub-sample. Even if the rabb-al-māl were initially 
to be unaware of the differences between the two risk-types, thus leading, 
pro tem, pooling equilibrium to prevail in the markets, there will come a time 
eventually when the low-risk mudāribs will be able to disabuse arbāb-al-māl of 
the fallacious symmetry.
If all mudāribs have equal access (in both quantity and quality) to private 
information concerning their own risk-types, and if they reflect their private 
information fully in their contracting with the rabb-al-māl, then pooled equilibria 
are unlikely to exist in the murārabah market in a sustainable manner. This is 
because the low-risk type will have material incentives to stake claims for high 
reservation profit ratios, and also lower loss ratios versus ‘h’-type mudāribs. 
Could they predictably carry the power of persuasion with the rabb-al-māl? 
We have already said that the latter is equally credulous lot when it comes to 
private risk information. But even so, that would not prevent the low-risk types 
from offering convincing arguments for why they deserve higher profit ratios 
compared with their higher-risk competitors. The main take-away from this 
discussion is that the issue of material incentives, unleashed by differences in 
incentive-compatibility between the high and low risk mudārib types, would 
likely create larger frequency of contracting frictions when it comes to pooling 
equilibria. On that basis, therefore, such pooling equilibria are more likely to be 
of interest as episodic, transitional, significance in murārabah markets.
The combination of heterogeneity and equal access to private risk 
information among the mudāribs would likely spawn beneficial externalities of 
competitive disclosures by the low-risk mudāribs preparatory to ‘educating’ the 
arbāb-al-māl. Cross-subsidizing of the high-risk mudāribs at the expense of the 
low-risk ones is likely to be the defining pitch of such competitive disclosures 
by the latter. 
The systematic differences between the low- and high-risk mudāribs 
in terms of the underlying material incentives will render the incentive-
compatibility constraint of the high-risk types binding. If separating equilibria 
are not enforced, whatever contracts will be acceptable to low-risk types will 
also be acceptable to the high-risk types. The challenge facing the policy-makers 
in Islamic economy is to devise and market murārabah contracts that could be 
offered to the low-risk murārabah types that would also not attract high-risk 
types. 
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3.5  Separating Equilibrium 
In Figure 3, points ‘Al’ and ‘Ah’ are the points that correspond to the full-
subscription of the arbāb-al-māl’ capital for the two risk groups. The low-risk 
mudāribs ought to have higher wealth because their probability of experiencing 
a loss is lower. 
 
Figure 3: Separating equilibrium
The point labeled ‘C’ on the fair odds line for the ‘l’ group is where the 
indifference curve from the full-subscription point for the ‘h’ group crosses the 
fair odds line for the ‘l’ group. The indifference curve ‘Ul’ that intersects point 
‘C’ is steeper than the corresponding curve for the ‘h’ group. The marginal rate 
of substitution corresponding to the ‘h’ group is smaller compared with the ‘l’ 
group. At ‘C’, one is at the best outcome one could offer to the ‘l’ types that 
would not also attract ‘h’ types: this is because ‘C’ does not admit any tangency 
between the fair-odds line for the high-risk types of mudāribs. The outcome C+
 
on the figure would be strictly preferred by the ‘l’ types, because the point C+ is 
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The issue is that the outcome C+
 
would also be preferred by the ‘h’ types, 
presumably for the same reason, which would create pressures for bringing the 
pooling equilibrium back in. The outcome of C- is one which would be rejected 
by ‘h’ types, but ‘l’ types would strictly prefer outcome C, the original outcome. 
So, any outcome like C- is dominated by C.
It would be neat if outcomes ‘Ah’ and ‘C’ could somehow be offered in 
the muḍārabah markets, and, in addition, type ‘h’ would always choose ‘Ah’ and 
type ‘l’ would always choose outcome ‘C’. Both outcomes have the desirable 
property of lying on the fair odds line for the group whose capital requirements 
are being met. But the complicating issue is that because the percentage split 
is the same for both profits and also losses, and also because that split does 
not differentiate among entrepreneurs based on whether they are loss-leaders or 
profit-leaders, low-risk mudāribs are likely to be only partly covered, relative 
to high-risk ones. Compared with low-risk mudāribs, high-risk users of capital 
receive a certain amount of preferential treatment. 
But if it were practicable to fully cover the capital needs of the low-
risk mudāribs, it was not going to be practicable to inoculate them from the 
high-risk ones. The main problem is that preferences of high-risk mudāribs are 
binding and shape up as the constraint on the murārabah market. The challenge 
before the policy-makers is that the decision rules of capital allocation (that is, 
the sharing ratios for profits as well as loss) must maximize the well-being of 
low-risk mudāribs subject to the constraint that the high-risk ones can be weaned 
from the low-risk ones. This is the essence of separating equilibrium.5
Following this chain of argument, separating murārabah contracts are 
designed for two separate kinds of contracts tailor-made to reflect the different 
risk profiles of the two groups of mudāribs. As well, there is a need to ensure 
that the two groups find it in their interest to self-select into buying the contract 
tailor-made for it. The crucial issue is how to do both of those two things. The 
short answer is Sharī’ah-compliant variable-return schemes direly depend upon 
certain institutional, informational and behavioral structures, allowances and 
sanctions that make it imperative for both high- and low-risk agents to separate 
themselves in the way in which they sort out the murārabah contracts they sign 
up. Due to space limitations for this paper, just what those structures, allowances 
and sanctions can be is left as the subject-matter for a follow-up research. 
We have invoked heterogeneity and information frictions among 
prospective participants, and established self-selection of mutually-exclusive 
types of murārabah and mushārakah contracts that would endure as separating 
equilibria a ‘second-best’ solution. Separating ‘equilibria’ will require the 
establishment of both voluntary signaling and enforced screening to be well-
articulated institutional features of the market. This will be so that the problems 
posed by hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral 
hazard) are substantively neutralized, if not altogether eliminated. However, 
5 High-risk muḍāribs are no better off for the harm they do to the low-risk group. One group loses 
but no group gains. This is the opposite of Pareto improvement—and potentially a large social 
cost.
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the foregoing points at quite a formidable exercise. This paper is already 
long enough. It will be more appropriate to attempt the policy/interventions that 
are preparatory to any solution of the problem posed in this paper in the form of 
a research note to be written in the near future.
4.  Conclusions
The main reason why mushārakah and mudārabah are the smallest portion 
of the Sharī’ah-compliant mix of financing modes currently used is because 
the incentives of the users of capital are not adequately aligned with those of 
the providers of the capital. Equity always represents hard-earned savings of 
some people. In a murārabah, agents who have typically been starved in their 
occupational careers of the access to capital are handed close access to it. This 
can be a compelling experience, triggering ambition and unseemly dispatch 
in getting to where ambition leads. In addition, it is these agents that enjoy a 
predictable cache of capability not possessed by other co-transactors. Many of 
the mudāribs have the virtue of informational advantage compared with the 
rabb-al-māl. The two factors, ambition and advantage, combine to result in a 
rather potent influence. The situation is made even more volatile in that some 
muḍāribs represent steadier and safer hands in which to put management of 
valuable businesses than others. 
The apparent irreconcilability of incentives that is very much intrinsic 
to mushārakah/mudārabah can be moderated if there were some built-in 
features that could induce low-risk and high-risk mudāribs into channels of 
self-selection representing different terms and conditions of the murārabah that 
could be custom-made. In the language of microeconomics, what is needed is 
a separating equilibrium of mudāribs representing differences in risk types or 
in the proclivity to indulge in his informational advantage to advance his own 
financial interest to the exclusion of his partner’s. However, such volitional self-
selection does not come in a costless or easy manner. An institutional framework 
is needed in the Islamic Finance industry to stay the hands of entrepreneur to 
engage the financiers to reduce the risk of asymmetric information and incentive-
compatibility. It is possible to devise such an institutional framework for the 
advancement of these core financing modes to become more acceptable as a 
means to spur financing to entrepreneurs. 
The root causes of the high private costs of securing separating 
equilibrium have to do with (i) the barriers that wall-off islands of private 
information from the public square, (ii) the hierarchical nature of socio-economic 
institutions which impedes the equality of both the elites and the ordinary before 
the law and (iii) the preponderance of archaic, manual, methods for capturing 
economically relevant disclosures. All these difficulties create a kind of obstacle 
course in the economic setting. That in turn makes it especially difficult to 
intervene with some variant of signaling/screening combinations, which, as in 
other risky economic settings, have been deployed with good results. A detailed 
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account of the policy interventions must, however, be the subject of a future 
research.
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